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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

MICHAEL RAY ANDERSON,

:

Case No. 990880-CA
Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for
Aggravated Robbery, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-301
(1999) 8c 76-6-302 (1999), in the Third Judicial District Court,
State of Utah, the Honorable Anthony B. Quinn, Judge, presiding.
Jurisdiction is conferred on this court pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (j) (1996) .

See Addendum A (Judgment, Sentence

and Conviction).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND THE STANDARDS OF REVIEW
I.

Did the trial court err in denying Anderson's motion for

a continuance and a new trial when he was surprised by
exculpatory fingerprint evidence?
Standard of Review: "We review the denial of a motion for a
new trial based on newly discovered evidence on the same basis as
any other denial of a new trial motion--whether the trial court
abused its discretion."

State v. Loose, 2000 UT 11 1 16, 994

P.2d 1237 (citing State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 793 (Utah 1991)).
II. Did the trial court err in denying Anderson's motion for
a directed verdict where the State failed to present sufficient

evidence of aggravated robbery?
Standard of Review:

"•'We review the evidence and all

inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it in the light
most favorable to the verdict of the jury.''

Reversal of a jury

conviction based on insufficient evidence is warranted 'when the
evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which
he was convicted.'"

State v. Leleae, 1999 UT App 368 % 17, 993

P.2d 232 (citations and quotations omitted).
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT
Mr. Anderson's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
is preserved on the record for appeal ("R.") at 147 (minute
entry), 335-40, 517-22 and 544-45.

His motion for a continuance

or a new trial based on newly discovered evidence is preserved at
R.546-48

(motion for continuance); 674,667-82 (motion for new

trial, minute entry, court's findings and conclusions).
STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The following statutes, rules and constitutional provisions
are determinative of the issues on appeal:
Robbery, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (1999):
(1) A person commits robbery if: (a) the person
unlawfully and intentionally takes or attempts to take
personal property in the possession of another from his
person, or immediate presence, against his will, by
means of force or fear; or (b) the person intentionally
or knowingly uses force or fear of immediate force
against another in the course of committing a theft.
(2) An act shall be considered "in the course of
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committing a theft" if it occurs in an attempt to
commit theft, commission of theft, or in the immediate
flight after the attempt or commission. (3) Robbery is
a felony of the second degree.
Aggravated Robbery, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1999):
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the
course of committing robbery, he:(a) uses or threatens
to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section
76-1-601; (b) causes serious bodily injury upon another;
or(c) takes an operable motor vehicle.(2) Aggravated
robbery is a first degree felony.(3) For the purposes
of this part, an act shall be considered to be "in the
course of committing a robbery" if it occurs in an
attempt to commit, during the commission of, or in the
immediate flight after the attempt or commission of a
robbery.
Discovery, Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 (2000):
(a) Except as otherwise
provided, the prosecutor shall
disclose to the defense upon request the following
material or information of which he has knowledge:(1)
relevant written or recorded statements of the
defendant or codefendants;(2) the criminal record of
the defendant;(3) physical evidence seized from the
defendant or codefendant;(4) evidence known to the
prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the
accused, mitigate the guilt of the defendant, or
mitigate the degree of the offense for reduced
punishment; and (5) any other item of evidence which
the court determines on good cause shown should be made
available to the defendant in order for the defendant
to adequately prepare his defense.(b) The prosecutor
shall make all disclosures as soon as practicable
following the filing of charges and before the
defendant is required to plead. The prosecutor has a
continuing duty to make disclosure. . . .(g) If at any
time during the course of the proceedings it is brought
to the attention of the court that a party has failed
to comply with this rule, the court may order such
party to permit the discovery or inspection, grant a
continuance, or prohibit the party from introducing
evidence not disclosed, or it may enter such other
order as it deems just under the circumstances.
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Motion For New Trial, Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 24
(2000) :
(a) The court may, upon motion of a party or upon its
own initiative, grant a new trial in the interest of
justice if there is any error or impropriety which had
a substantial adverse effect upon the rights of a
party.
Criminal Actions - Due Process of Law, United States
Constitution Amendment V:
No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law.
Due Process of Law, United States Constitution Amendment
XIV:
No State shall . . . deprive any person of life,
liberty or property, without due process of law.
Due Process of Law, Utah Constitution Article I, Section 7:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case, Course of the Proceedings,
and Disposition in the Court Below.
Motion For a Directed Verdict:

Mr. Anderson was charged by

information with one count of robbery on the basis that he
"unlawfully and intentionally took personal property in the
possession of Mervyns from the person or immediate presence of
Ann Ma[jd]i and Sharlotte Billings, and in the course of
committing said robbery used or threatened the use of a dangerous
weapon, and/or caused serious bodily injury to Ann Ma[jd]i and
Sharlotte Billings" pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302(a)
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(1999).

R.l.

An arrest warrant was issued.

R.3.

The State

later amended the information to include Elizabeth Ashdown as one
of the victims.

R.75.

At trial, Mr. Anderson clarified with the State and the
court that the State was proceeding under that variant of the
robbery statute ("subsection (1)(a)"), and that the jury was
instructed under subsection (1)(a) as well.

R. 335-36,338.

The

State agreed that it was proceeding under that theory of robbery.
R.33 7.

The court likewise noted that the State was bound by the

theory set forth in its amended information.

Id.

Mr. Anderson

pointed out to the court that the "immediate presence" element
under subsection (1)(a) could not be shown.

R.33 8.

The court

responded that Mr. Anderson should raise a motion for a directed
verdict at the close of the State's case.

R.339-40.

Mr. Anderson moved for a directed verdict when the State
rested.

R.517-21.

He argued that the State failed to establish

that he took property from the immediate presence of another as
required by subsection (1)(a).

R.518.

He explained that robbery

is a personal crime; that Mervynsf is not a person for purposes
of robbery; and that each of the three Mervyns employees who
testified stated that they did not know that property had been
taken at the time they confronted the man in the foyer and
therefore the man did not take anything against their will.
The trial court denied Mr. Andersonfs motion.

R.522.

also gave the following jury instructions:
Instruction 21: You are instructed that Mervyns is not
5

Id.
It

a natural person but rather is a corporation or other
legal entity, and as such can only act through its
employees or agents. The conduct and activities of
Mervyns employees is considered the conduct and
activities of Mervyns.
Instruction 22: Before you can convict the defendant
. . Of the offense of Aggravated Robbery as charged in
the Information, you must find from all of the evidence
and beyond a reasonable doubt each and every one of the
following elements of that offense:
1. That . . . defendant . . . took personal property
then in the possession of Mervyns from the person or
immediate presence of Sharlotte Billings, Ann Majdi,
Elizabeth Ashdown of Mervyns. . . .
4. That such taking was against the will of
Sharlotte Billings, Ann Majdi, Elizabeth Ashdown of
Mervyns....
R.172-73.
Mr. Anderson objected to the jury instructions on corporate
agency, asserting that they misstated the law and were misleading
because property must be taken from the immediate presence of
another in order to find him guilty.

R.544-45.

The court

overruled Mr. Anderson's objection, reasoning that subsection
(1)(a) contemplates corporate entities acting through their
employees, and that the statute is not limited to robbery
committed against natural persons.

R.545.

Motion For a Continuance or New Trial: Based on the new
evidence concerning the absence of Mr. Anderson's fingerprints,
Mr. Anderson moved for a continuance of his trial.

R.54 6.

The

court denied the motion, reasoning that the absence of prints was
not exculpatory and, at best, it was inconclusive as to guilt or
innocence.

R.547.

The court also stated that Anderson made no

showing that a print analysis could not have been done before
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trial, that the police failed to meet the discovery request, that
they withheld exculpatory evidence from him, or that he was
prejudiced by the new evidence in light of other evidence against
him.

R.547,687.

However, post trial, the court ordered the

State "to test the shoe box to see if there was a match with any
prints on the shoe box with those of the defendant.
was tested and some latent prints were visible.

The shoe box

A comparison was

attempted with the prints lifted, however, no match was found
with those of the defendant."

R.687.

Anderson was tried before a jury and found guilty as
charged.

R.188-89,191.

He was sentenced to a five-to-life

prison term on September 3, 1999.
appeal on October 1, 1999.

R.197.

He timely filed for an

R.204-05.

Post conviction, on October 1, 1999, Anderson moved for a
new trial on the same basis.

R.213-26.

The court denied the

motion on the basis that it was not filed within ten days of
sentencing pursuant to Utah R. Crim. P. 24(c) (1999).

R.241-42.

Anderson filed a motion for reconsideration and reminded the
court that it granted him a 30 day extension in which to file the
motion.

R.243-63.

The court acknowledged the extension and set

a hearing date on Anderson's motion for a new trial. R.264-68.
On February 11, 2000, the motion for a new trial was heard.
R.682.

The court denied the motion.

R.682,688.

In its findings

of facts and conclusions of law, dated March 12, 2000, the court

7

stated:
(1) the defendant has failed to show that he was
prejudiced by the Court's ruling denying the
continuance of trial to conduct finger print analysis;
(2) at the time of trial the requested finger print
analysis was speculative, inconclusive and was not
exculpatory.
Post trial the Court granted defendant's request to
test the shoebox and compare the prints obtained to
those of the defendant. Test results were inconclusive
as no match was found. Defendant's request for new
trial, based upon the finger print analysis, is denied
as no prejudice can be gleaned from the new testing.
The evidence is inconclusive at best.
R.688.
Mr. Anderson timely filed an amended notice of appeal on
March 14, 2000, from the denial of his motion for
reconsideration.

R.6 90.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

On November 13, 1998, at a Mervyns store located on Fort
Union Boulevard, Elizabeth Ashdown ("Ashdown"), a Mervyns
security employee, was monitoring a close circuit television
inside the store camera room.
monitor for shoplifters.

R.394,396.

Her duty was to

R.396.

Ashdown observed an adult male and adult female in the shoe
department.

R.3 97.

Although Ashdown did not observe an actual

shoplift, she testified that the man exhibited typical "shoplift
nervous behavior."

R.397.

Ashdown watched as the man selected a

pair of shoes, sat on a bench, tried one of the shoes on, and
walked around to test the shoe's fit.
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R.398.

Ashdown then saw

the man exit the store.

R.399.

She also testified that the man

looked up at the camera before he left the shoe department.
R.397.

Ashdown viewed an alarm light go off as the man exited

the store.
alarm.

Id.

She left the camera room to respond to the

Id.

By the time Ashdown reached the doors, another Mervyns
employee, Ann Majdi ("Majdi"), had already responded to the alarm
and was standing in the doorway looking outside, speaking to the
man.

R.4 00.

Majdi approached the man and woman and asked if

perhaps a Mervyns clerk left the merchandise tag on an item that
they purchased.

R.362.

The woman did not answer and walked away

I
quickly.
Id.

Id.

The man stepped toward Majdi and seemed nervous.

The man pulled a knife from his coat pocket and held it in

the palm of his hand, responding, "go ask her.

Maybe this."

R.363.

Majdi testified that she was fearful when she saw the

knife.

R.370.

Majdi stepped back into the doorway as Ashdown joined her.
R.364.
Id.

The man "went toward [Ashdown], showing the knife."

The man went back toward Majdi.

Id.

As he went back and

forth between Majdi and Ashdown, he repeated "go ask her.
this" three times.

R.37 6.

Ashdown testified that the man said, "I swear.
R.400.

Maybe

Go ask her."

According to Ashdown, the man gripped the knife in his

hand and pointed it first at Majdi, then herself, back at Majdi,
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then back at herself.
Just leave.'7

R.402.

Id.

Ashdown told the man, "it's fine.

Ashdown was frightened and focused on the

knife during the incident.

R.402,418.

The man ran away.

R.401.

Ashdown never saw the woman that she previously observed on the
video.

R.404.

Ashdown explained that the lighting was dim where

the encounter occurred, and it was dark outside.

R.438,440.

Meanwhile, Sharlotte Billings ("Billings"), another Mervyns
employee, was walking with Majdi just prior to the alarm
sounding.

R.444.

They had just parted ways when the alarm went

off and Majdi went out the door.

R.445.

Billings went to the

door way and observed through the open doors the man with the
knife looking at Majdi.
of the man's face.

R.445-46.

R.463.

She had an unobstructed view

She described the man as holding the

knife in a "threatening gesture" towards Majdi.
then ran out the door.
to Ashdown .

R.446.

Id.

R.447.

Ashdown

Billings saw the man "jump[]" over

Billings could not see what the man did

with the knife at that point because her view was obstructed by
the doorway.

Id.

Billings could not hear anything as she looked

on, but stated that she was shocked and frightened.

R.448.

Ashdown and Majdi came back into the store, visibly shaken.
R.404,414,448 .

Ashdown reviewed the surveillance video and

realized then that the man took the shoes.

R.405.

A shoe box

was located with an old pair of Nike shoes in it, size 10.
R.428.

The shoe box listed a corresponding size of 10.
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Id.

Ashdown contacted the police thirty minutes after the incident.
R.413-14.
The case was assigned to Detective Doug McGrath ("McGrath")
from the Midvale City Police Department.

R.478.

Unable to

identify the suspect, he had the surveillance video aired on Fox
13 News on November 24, 1998. R.479-80.

On November 30, Sam

Gonzales ("Gonzales") indicated that he might be able to identify
the man, but asked to see the video two more times before doing
so.

R.514-15.

the suspect.

Gonzales identified Appellant Michael Anderson as

R.515.

On December 3, 1998, McGrath assembled a color photo
spread consisting of six individuals, including a color photo of
Anderson taken on October 24, 1998. R.381,482,549.
the photos to Majdi, Ashdown and Billings.

R.482.

He showed
He had each

witness look at the photo array outside the presence of the
others and he gave each one a written admonition.

R.483-84.

McGrath testified that each witness read and signed the
admonition.

R.484.

The admonition reads as follows:

You will be asked to look at a group of photographs.
The fact that the photos are shown to you should not
influence your judgment. You should not conclude or
guess that the photographs contain the picture of the
person who committed the crime. You are not under any
obligation to identify anyone. It is just as important
to free an innocent person of suspicion as to identify
guilty parties. You are not to be influenced by the
fact that the person in the photograph may appear to
have a beard, mustache, or long hair. Do not be
influenced by the fact that some of the pictures may be
in color while others are in black and white. Please
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do not discuss this case with other witnesses or
indicate in any way that you have or have not
identified someone.
Id.
Majdi picked Anderson out of the array.

R.382.

Prior to

the array, she saw the surveillance video one time the day after
the incident and talked about the incident with Ashdown and
Billings.

R.383.

She did not provide any other description to

the police beforehand.

Id.

Billings also picked Anderson from the array.

R.453.

She

selected him because of his distinctive eyes and eyebrows.
R.462.

She testified that she looked at the suspect's eyes

during the incident.

R.463,472.

three weeks prior to the array.

She also saw the video one time
R.466.

Ashdown could not identify anyone as the suspect out of the
photo array.

R.416.

She viewed the video ten to fifteen times

before viewing the array.

R.415.

She gave a description to the

police prior to seeing the video, stating that he was an adult
Hispanic male with short, greased-back hair, wearing a polo-type
golf shirt, a large dark Nike jacket, long dark baggy jeans.
R.434.
After the photo array, McGrath arrested Anderson pursuant to
a warrant.

R.490.

Anderson maintained his innocence.

He took a

lie detector test which indicated that he was not lying when he
denied involvement in the theft of the shoes.

12

Anderson was

wearing a black pair of Nike shoes at the time of his arrest.
Id.

The shoes (size 10 H) were not the same size or style of

shoes that were stolen from Mervyns*.

R.490,499.

McGrath did

not search Anderson's residence to determine if he had any
clothing that matched that worn by the suspect in the video.
R.505,507.

McGrath had no other suspects in the case, and did

not follow up on any other leads, because Majdi, Billings and
Ashdown identified Anderson as the perpetrator.

R.507-08.

McGrath collected the shoebox and the old shoes left therein
into evidence on November 24, 1998.

R.487,489,494.

requested that the box be tested for prints.

R.491.

Anderson
Anderson

was told that there were no fingerprints on the box and that his
request was denied.

R.492,546.

However, Anderson learned at

trial that McGrath actually had the box tested for prints.
R.487.

Partial prints, which McGrath described as smudges, plus

one almost complete print were lifted from the box.
The prints were partially analyzed.

R.492.

R.487-88.

None of the prints

were compared with those of other people in an effort to
establish the identity of the suspect.

R.492.

McGrath explained

that he had not compared the prints on the box with other prints
because the box had been handled by so many Mervyns employees by
the time he collected it into evidence that it was
"contaminated."

R.488,509.

The shoes themselves were not tested

because it was not possible to lift a print off the fabric from
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which they were made.

R.493.

Mr. Anderson presented an alibi witness, Barbara Smith
("Smith").

Smith is the mother of Mr. Anderson!s girlfriend, and

the grandmother of their child.

R.524.

Smith explained that

Anderson and her daughter live in the mother-in-law apartment in
her house, which shares a common kitchen with her portion of the
house.

Smith testified that Anderson had a barbeque with them on

the evening of November 13, 1998.

R.528.

Anderson and her

daughter then went to their apartment for the rest of the
evening, coming down occasionally to get food out of the
refrigerator.

R.529.

Smith testified that Anderson did not

leave the house that night because he and his girlfriend were
tending to her four year old child.

Id.

Smith also explained

that Anderson did not borrow her car that night.

Id.

She could

not state with certainty, however, that Anderson did not leave
the apartment on the bus or with another person.

R.534.

Smith explained that she did not call the police immediately
after Anderson was arrested to tell them that he was with her on
the night in question.

R.536.

She testified that the police

never asked her for such information, and although two officers
came to her house, they did not want any information from her
regarding Andersonfs whereabouts.

Id.

She further testified

that she and Anderson do not always get along, and that she does
not feel any particular loyalty toward him and would not lie for
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him.

R.536A.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court abused its discretion in denying Anderson a

new trial upon newly discovered exculpatory fingerprint evidence
that could not have been discovered with due diligence, that was
not cumulative, and that would make a different result probable
on retrial.

The trial court also erred as a matter of law in

misinstructing the jury as to the elements of robbery where it
gave an instruction that Mervyns, a corporate entity, was a
person for purposes of the robbery statute.

Lastly, the trial

court abused its discretion in denying Anderson's motion for a
directed verdict where the State failed to present sufficient
evidence of the "immediate presence" element as required by the
robbery statute.
ARGUMENT
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT A NEW
TRIAL UPON NEWLY DISCOVERED FINGERPRINT EVIDENCE.
The trial court erred in denying Anderson!s motion for a new
trial upon newly discovered fingerprint evidence. R.682,685-88.
A new trial is necessary in order to present new evidence
establishing that Anderson's prints were not on the shoebox that
contained the stolen pair of shoes. Moreover, as noted by
Anderson in his motion for a new trial, additional testing of the
prints would be
crucial to the case given the fact that this was an
eyewitness identification case. The State has access
to a fingerprint identification system in which they
15

may easily analyze fingerprints and compare them
against a large bank of fingerprints of people who have
been fingerprinted. This was important information for
the defense and would have been used to investigate
whether the fingerprint belonged to someone other than
the defendant and whether that person may have even
looked like the person who was shown on the security
video.
R.671 (Anderson's Motion for New Trial).
Pursuant to Rule 24 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure
(2000), "[t]he court may . . . grant a new trial in the interest
of justice if there is any error or impropriety which had a
substantial adverse effect upon the rights of a party."

Utah

Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(g) (2000) similarly states, " [i]f
at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to
the attention of the court that a party has failed to comply with
[discovery] . . . , the court may . . . grant a continuance, or
it may enter such other order as it deems just under the
circumstances."

See also United States Const, amends. V & XIV

(due process); Utah Const. Art. I, § 7 (same).
The decision to grant or deny a motion for a mistrial lies
within the discretion of the trial court.

See State v. Loose,

2000 UT 11 11 16, 994 P.2d 1237.
The legal elements for analyzing a claim for a new
trial based on newly discovered evidence are as
follows: the moving party must demonstrate from the
proffered evidence that: "(i) it could not, with
reasonable diligence, have been discovered and produced
at the trial; (ii) it is not merely cumulative; and
(iii) it must make a different result probable on
retrial."
Id. (quoting State v. Martin, 1999 UT 72 % 5, 984 P.2d 975)
(citing State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 793 (Utah 1991)).
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The trial court below denied Anderson's motion for a new
trial.

R.682.

The trial court made the following findings of

fact:
[After confronting defendant, whereby defendant]
pointed [a] knife . . . in an aggressive manner . . .
[and] fled on foot[, Mervyns] [s]tore personnel
discovered that a pair of tennis shoes were missing and
that the shoebox the defendant was handling had an old
pair of shoes in the box. Several store personnel
handled the shoebox prior to handing the evidence over
to the police. . . .
Police officers took custody of the shoebox. . . .
At trial the prosecution presented the videotape
evidence, the eyewitness testimony of the store
employees, photo-spread identification and the
testimony of Sam Gonzales. No fingerprint evidence was
presented, as testing was not done because of the
overwhelming identification evidence.
Defense counsel requested a continuance of the
trial in order to obtain finger print analysis of the
shoebox. The Court denied the motion citing that
defense counsel had previously continued the case and
had ample opportunity to seek this testing prior to
trial. The Court further ruled that the lack of finger
print analysis was not prejudicial in light of the
other evidence of identification and that the evidence
was inconclusive at best.
At trial the defendant presented an alibi defense
and also argued the fact that no finger print analysis
was accomplished.
Post conviction defendant moved this Court for a
new trial, requesting the testing of the shoebox in an
effort to show that the defendant was prejudiced by the
lack of testing. This Court ordered the prosecution to
test the shoebox to see if there was a match with any
prints on the shoebox with those of the defendant.
The shoebox was tested and some latent prints were
visible. A comparison was attempted with the prints
lifted, however, no match was found with those of the
defendant.
R.686-87.

The court made the following conclusions of law:

This Court denies the defendant's motion for a new
trial on the following grounds: (1) the defendant has
failed to show that he was prejudiced by the Court's
ruling denying the continuance of trial to conduct
finger print analysis; (2) at the time of trial the
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requested finger print analysis was speculative,
inconclusive and was not exculpatory.
Post trial the Court granted defendant's request
to test the shoebox and compare the prints obtained to
those of the defendant. Test results were inconclusive
as no match was found. Defendant's request for a new
trial, based upon the finger print analysis, is denied
as no prejudice can be gleaned from the new testing.
The evidence is inconclusive at best.
R.687-88.
The trial court abused its discretion because the discovery
of fingerprint evidence merited a new trial in Anderson's case.
See Loose, 2000 UT 11 1 16.

First, such evidence "could not,

with reasonable diligence, have been discovered and produced at
the trial."

Id.

Anderson duly filed a pretrial motion for

discovery pursuant to Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 16.
18 (Anderson's Discovery Request).

R.17-

The discovery motion

expressly requested " [a]11 evidence tending to negate . . . [or]
mitigate the guilt of the Defendant," plus " [a]11 evidence that
the prosecutor may obtain in the future relevant to [Anderson's]
case."

Id.

Anderson also expressly requested that the shoebox be tested
for fingerprints.

R.491-92.

During cross-examination of

Detective McGrath, the following colloquy ensued:
Anderson: Well, detective, let's go right to
fingerprints since you and I had a brief conversation
about this before court this morning. One reason the
box was sent back out for fingerprints is I called you
and asked that it be sent out, right?
McGrath: Actually the request that I received to
fingerprint the box was - Anderson: But I had a conversation with you.
remember that?
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Do you

McGrath: Yes.
R. 491-92.

McGrath also testified that the State requested that

the box be fingerprinted.

R.4 92.

Anderson followed up with Detective McGrath by asking him
about the status of the fingerprinting.

R.492.

The following

colloquy establishes that Anderson was told that no fingerprints
fit for analysis could be found.
Anderson: And then recently I had a conversation with
you where you told me there was no fingerprints found
on the box?
McGrath: At that time there hadn't been, no.
R.492.
Yet, despite Anderson's diligence in filing a discovery
request, asking that the shoebox be tested, and in following up
on that request, Anderson was never informed that the box was
actually analyzed as evinced by the following colloquy:
Anderson: Now today you're telling us that there are
some fingerprints that they identified on the box?
McGrath: Well, they have been partially processed, but
they haven't been linked to anybody yet. . . . There
are some prints . . . , some partial, one appears to be
a full print; but as far as having them compared with
anybody at this time, that hasn't been done.
R.492.
The failure on the part of the State to inform Anderson that
the box was actually tested establishes that, in fact, the
evidence "could not, with reasonable diligence, have been
discovered and produced at the trial."

Loose, 2000 UT 11 % 16.

Indeed, the State's failure to inform Anderson about the testing
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highlights the court's error in finding that Anderson did not
exercise due diligence in requesting the fingerprint analysis.
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(b) states, M[t]he prosecutor
has a continuing duty to make disclosure."

See also State v.

Blair, 868 P.2d 802, 807 (Utah 1993) ("prosecution has a
continuing duty to disclose interviews and other discovery
material to the defense on request").

The State's continuing

duty to disclose exists even if the prosecutor himself is not
aware of the fingerprinting, but a police officer working on the
case is.

See State v. Shabata, 678 P.2d 785, 788 (Utah 1984)

(citation omitted).

"Information known to police officers

working on a case is charged to the prosecution since the
officers are part of the prosecution team."

Id.

Accordingly, the discovery of the new fingerprint evidence
merits a new trial, in part, because Anderson exercised due
diligence in trying to get such evidence, but was otherwise
precluded from doing so when the State neglected to inform him
that fingerprinting had actually been done.

See Loose, 2000 UT

11 H 16.
In addition, a new trial is required because the fingerprint
evidence "is not merely cumulative."

Id.

No other fingerprint

evidence was presented in this case.

The Defense raised the

issue of the fingerprint testing only to establish that it had,
in fact, been done.

R.491-92; see supra.

At most, the colloquy

between Anderson and McGrath established that the prints found
had been partially analyzed but had not been compared to those of
20

anyone else, including Anderson.

R.4 92.

Nothing in this

evidence established for the jury sitting in Anderson's trial
that the fingerprints were not linked to him at all, as
determined by the post-trial testing.

Moreover, nothing in this

evidence approximates the value of a positive identification of
the prints, which could be located if Anderson was allowed to run
them through the State's fingerprint databank.
The State referenced the fingerprinting during its direct
examination of Detective McGrath only to make the point that it
would be inconclusive given that so many people handled the box
beforehand such that it was contaminated.

R.487-89.

The State

also raised the issue to emphasize that fingerprints would only
serve to "confirm the identification" of the suspect identified
by the Mervyns employees.1

R.489.

Such evidence was never

The State brought up the fingerprint evidence in the
following colloquy:
State: Did you do anything about those shoes?
McGrath: . . . [S]ometime later there was a request to
have the box and shoes fingerprinted. And I turned the
evidence over to our evidence custodian to process them
for prints. . . . I understand that there are partial
prints on the box . . . but they have not been analyzed
and compared with the defendant's at this time. . . .
The shoes and box have been handled quite a bit by the
store employees. Because of that, usually evidence is
contaminated. . . . And with the material delay [in
picking the box up from Mervyns'] . . . there is a
possibility for contamination.
State: Plus by the time you got the request for the
prints, hadn't you already identified the defendant?
McGrath: Yes.
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raised for the specific purpose of exonerating Anderson; if
anything, it was employed by the State for the opposite purpose
of asserting his guilt.
Furthermore, fingerprint evidence tending to exculpate
Anderson, or exonerating him altogether, would not be merely
cumulative simply because he presented one alibi witness, Barbara
Smith.

R.524-3 6A.

Fingerprint evidence is qualitatively

different from witness testimony in that it is positive,
objective and neutral.

Smith's alibi witness testimony, on the

other hand, is subject to credibility determinations by the jury.
As noted in James, neutral evidence such as a fingerprint "is not
merely cumulative of a criminal defendant's testimony [or that of
his alibi witness(es).]

It is of a different kind and nature . .

and it certainly could have a different quality in the eyes of
the jurors."

819 P.2d at 794.

Finally, the discovery of fingerprint evidence merits a new
trial because it would "make a different result probable on

State: What is the purpose of fingerprints?
McGrath: Well, to confirm the identification.
State: Do you ever use it when you have no knowledge of
a suspect?
McGrath: Yes.
State: But at this point in time you already had the
suspect?
McGrath: Yes, sir.
R.487-89.
22

retrial."2

Loose, 2000 UT 11 1 16.

The State's case against

Anderson was based entirely on eyewitness identification
testimony that was neither overwhelming nor entirely compelling.
See James, 819 P.2d at 795 (holding new evidence from neutral
source would result in a probable different result where other
evidence going to central issue of intent was "not overwhelming
or compelling").
As noted in State v. Long, the efficacy of eyewitness
testimony in general is inherently limited.

721 P.2d at 488-90

(noting inaccuracies in acquisition and storage of memory; human
propensity to compensate for memory gaps; and deleterious effects
of personal experience, biases, subsequent events, prejudices,
race differences, poor lighting, fright, and speed of events).
"The United States Supreme Court has [also] acknowledged that
1

[t]he vagaries of eyewitness identification are well-known; the

This prong of the analysis "is not a sufficiency of
evidence test." Kvles v. Whitlev, 514 U.S. 419, 434, 115 S.Ct.
1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995) (citing United States v. Baalev, 473
U.S. 667, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985); Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963))
(clarifying showing that defendant must make in asserting that
new evidence would result in a "reasonable probability" of a
different result). "The question is not whether the defendant
would more likely than not have received a different verdict with
the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair
trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of
confidence." Id.
Utah law similarly holds that this prong is not a
sufficiency test. In James, the Supreme Court held that new
evidence would make a different result probable because the other
"evidence [going to defendant's intent - the issue at the trial]
. . . , while
sufficient,
is not overwhelming or compelling."
819 P.2d at 795 (emphasis added).
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annals of criminal law are rife with instances of mistaken
identification.'" Id. at 491 (quoting United States v. Wade. 388
U.S. 218, 228, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 1932, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967)).
The efficacy of the eyewitness testimony involved here is no
less limited.3

Each of the eyewitnesses personally viewed the

perpetrator in a dimly lit foyer, at knife-point, at night,
within a thirty second time frame.

R.402,438,440.

Majdi,

Billings, and Ashdown each testified that they were frightened
during the incident.

R.370,402,448. Other than Ashdown, who

viewed the man briefly on a surveillance video before the
confrontation, none of the Mervyns employees saw the man before
the incident in the foyer.

R.360-62,367,397,470; see infra Point

III (discussing insufficiency of evidence).

Ashdown admitted

that she was focused on the knife during the entire incident and
so could not later identify the man in a subsequent photo array.
R.402,416, 418.
There was no suspect in this case until Detective McGrath
aired the surveillance video on Fox 13 news almost three weeks
later.

R.479-80.

That alone generated the only identification

of the suspect by Gonzales, a man otherwise unassociated with
this incident, who told McGrath that the suspect looked like
Anderson.

R.515.

Based on that information, McGrath assembled

the photo array that was later shown to the Mervyns employees.
R.381,482,549.

3

The jury was given a Long instruction.
Instruction).
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R.162-64

(Text of

In the interim, Ashdown, Billings and Majdi viewed the
surveillance video and discussed the incident amongst themselves.
R.383,415,466 . The video provides a blurred picture of the man
in the shoe department.
Video)4.

See (State Exhibit 7 - Surveillance

The angle of the video is from high overhead, and is in

black and white.

Id.

close-up of the man.

It does not provide a high resolution,
Id.

When McGrath showed the array to Majdi

and Billings, each one selected Anderson as the man who most
looked like the suspect that they saw briefly in the foyer and as
a blurred image in the video.

R.382,453.

Such an attenuated

relationship between the fleeing man briefly seen in a dark foyer
over a thirty second time period at knife-point, the fuzzy figure
in the surveillance video, and Anderson who was identified by a
third party not at all associated with the events on November 13,
1998, does not provide a compelling or overwhelming eyewitness
identification case.
In addition, none of the other evidence presented at trial
is strongly suggestive of guilt.

For instance, there was no

direct evidence that positively linked Anderson to the crime,
such as the stolen shoes or the knife that Majdi, Billings, and
Ashdown allegedly saw in the perpetrator's hand.

R.490.

The

State likewise failed to locate clothing at the place where
Anderson was arrested that matched that of the man seen in the
4

The original video that was shown to the jury was lost
between Anderson's trial and his appeal. The record has been
supplemented with an exact copy of the video played for the jury.
See Order to Supplement Record (August 8, 2000).
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surveillance video, to wit, a mid-length black Nike jacket or
baggy black jeans.

R.5 07.

Moreover, the shoes worn by Anderson

at the time of his arrest were a different size (size 10 M) than
those stolen from Mervyns (size 10). R.499.
Consequently, the fingerprint evidence would "make a
different result probable on retrial."

Loose, 2000 UT 11 % 16.

At minimum, the post-trial testing, which established that
Anderson's prints were not on the box, would have a strong
tendency to exculpate Anderson.

Moreover, if allowed to run the

prints through the State's fingerprint databank to find an
identifiable match, Anderson would be able to exculpate himself,
provide the name of another suspect, and determine whether the
new suspect looked like the man seen in the video and in the
foyer by the Mervyns employees.
The United States Supreme Court has held that similar
evidence merits a new trial on account of its tendency to render
a different result "reasonably probable" on retrial.

See Kyles

v. Whitlev. 514 U.S. 419, 434, 450, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d
490 (1995) (citing United States v. Baqlev, 473 U.S. 667, 105
S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985); Bradv v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963)).

In Kyles. a list of

cars at the crime scene (including license plate numbers) that
was not disclosed to the defendant warranted a new trial because
it established that defendant's car was not there as originally
alleged.

Id. at 450.

The Court reasoned that the evidence had

value in countering an argument by the prosecution that
26

a grainy enlargement of a photograph of the crime scene
showed [defendant's] car in the background. The list
would also have shown that the police either knew that
it was inconsistent with their informant's . . .
statements or never even bothered to check the
informant's story against known fact.
Id.
As in Kyles, the fingerprint evidence has significant and
particular "value" since it would counter the State's allegation
that Anderson is the man in the fuzzy, black and white
surveillance video and impeach the eyewitnesses' testimony that
he was the person they confronted in the dimly lit foyer.

Id.

It would also show that McGrath did not conduct as thorough an
investigation into possible suspects as he could have and that he
was mistaken in assuming that he had his man after the shaky
eyewitness identifications from Majdi, Billings, and Gonzales.
Id.5

In short, the fingerprint evidence is qualitatively

different from either the eyewitness testimony or the other
evidence presented in this case in that it is objective and can
provide, at minimum, exculpatory, affirmative evidence that
Anderson did not touch the box.

The fingerprints can also

provide a positive identification of the true culprit in this
case which would exonerate Anderson altogether.

The court's error in failing to grant a new trial in this
case is all the more questionable given that it was aware that
Anderson took a pretrial polygraph examination which indicated
that he was telling the truth when he stated that he did not
steal shoes from Mervyns. R.61-74 (Motion to Allow Polygraph
Results). Although the evidence was excluded, R.138-39, the
court should have been more receptive to the possibility that the
State may have had the wrong person and allowed for a new trial
so that another jury may hear the fingerprint evidence.
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In light of the foregoing, the newly discovered fingerprint
evidence merits a new trial under the factors in Loose, 2000 UT
11 H 16.

Accordingly, the trial court erred in denying

Anderson's motion for a new trial.
II. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR AS A
MATTER OF LAW WHEN IT INCORRECTLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY.
The trial court erred as a matter of law when it
misinstructed the jury on the elements of aggravated robbery in
an inappropriate effort to make the facts presented at trial
conform to the aggravated robbery elements set forth in
subsection (1)(a) of the robbery statute.

See Utah Code Ann. §

76-6-301(1) (a) .
Anderson was charged in an amended information with the
"immediate presence" theory of robbery that is set forth in § 766-301(1) (a) ("subsection (1) (a)") . R.75 (Amended Information)4.
Anderson sought to clarify before trial began that the State did
not seek to prosecute the case under § 76-6-301(1)(b) and -(2)

The amended information provides:
Count I, Aggravated Robbery, a First Degree Felony, at
1146 East Fort Union Blvd., in Salt Lake Count, State
of Utah, on or about November 13, 1998, in violation of
[76-6-302] . . . in that defendant, Michael Ray
Anderson, a party to the offense, unlawfully and
intentionally took personal property in the possession
of Mervyn[f]s from the person or immediate presence of
Ann Majdi, Sharlette [sic] Billing [sic], and Elizabeth
Ashdown and in the course of committing said robbery
used or threatened the use of a dangerous weapon,
and/or caused serious bodily injury to Ann Majdi and
Elizabeth Ashdown.
R.75.
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("subsection (l)(b)").

R.335-36,338.

That subsection provides:

(1) A person commits robbery if: . . . (b) the person
intentionally or knowingly uses force or fear of
immediate force against another in the course of
committing a theft. (2) An act shall be considered "in
the course of committing a theft" if it occurs in an
attempt to commit theft, commission of theft, or in the
immediate flight after the attempt or commission.
Anderson further informed the court that there were possible
sufficiency issues to the extent that nothing was taken from the
"immediate presence" of anyone at Mervyns.

R.33 8.

Both the State and the court agreed that the case was to be
prosecuted under subsection (1)(a) of the robbery statute, and
not (1)(b).

R.337.

The court further noted that the State was

bound by the theory of the case it presented in the amended
information, to wit, the "immediate presence" theory of robbery.
Id.; see R.75 (Text of Amended Information - Included in Footnote
4) .
The court duly instructed the jury as to robbery under § 7 6 6-301(1) (a).

That instruction, Number 22, reads:

Before you can convict the defendant . . . of the
offense of Aggravated Robbery as charged in the
Information, you must find from all of the evidence and
beyond a reasonable doubt each and every one of the
following elements of that offense:
1. That . . . defendant . . . took personal property
then in the possession of Mervyns from the person or
immediate presence of Sharlotte Billings, Ann Majdi,
Elizabeth Ashdown of Mervyns. . . .
4. That such taking was against the will of
Sharlotte Billings, Ann Majdi, Elizabeth Ashdown of
Mervyn[']s. . . .
R.172-73.
After denying Anderson's motion, which was raised at the
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close of the State's case, the court instructed the jury that
Mervyns, as a corporation, was a person for purposes of the
aggravated robbery charge.
21.

R.522; see also Instruction Number

Instruction Number 21 states:
You are instructed that Mervyns is not a natural person
but rather is a corporation or other legal entity, and
as such can only act through its employees or agents.
The conduct and activities of Mervyns employees is
considered the conduct and activities of Mervyns.

Id.

The State also noted that the Utah Code defines "person" as

an individual or a private or public corporation.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(8) (1999).

R.547; see

In submitting the

instruction, the court reasoned that the robbery statute includes
legal entities like Mervyns that act through their agentemployees .

Id.

The court committed reversible legal error because the
instruction does not accurately or fairly relate the elements of
robbery under subsection (1)(a).

The Utah Supreme Court has

stated:
The jury must be instructed with respect to all the
legal elements that it must find to convict of the
crime charged, and the absence of such an instruction
is reversible error as a matter of law. . . . "The
general rule is that an accurate instruction upon the
basic elements of an offense is essential. Failure to
so instruct constitutes reversible error.". . . Thus,
the failure to give this instruction can never be
harmless error.
State v. Jones, 823 P.2d 1059, 1061 (Utah 1991) (quotation and
citations omitted); see also U.S. Const, amends. V & XIV (due
process); Utah Const. Art. I, § 7 (same).
The language of subsection (1)(a) of the robbery statute,
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when read in conjunction with the theft statute, establishes that
it contemplates only natural persons and not corporate entities
such as Mervyns.

Section 76-6-301 (1) (a) (robbery) proscribes the

taking of personal property directly

from a "person."

The theft

statute, on the other hand, does not address the taking of
property directly
(1999).

from a person.

See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404

Rather, it proscribes the act of "obtain[ing] or

exercis [ing] unauthorized control over the property of another
with a purpose to deprive him thereof."

Id.

Indeed, it is the act of taking property directly from a
person that elevates robbery to a second degree felony, or first
degree felony if aggravated.
301(1) (a) & 76-6-302.

See Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-

By contrast, because a natural person is

not involved in a theft, that offense is a class B misdemeanor
where, as here, the value of the stolen property is less than
See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412(1) (d) (1999) .5

$300.

In light of the language of the respective statutes
governing robbery and theft, the two statutes were intended to
proscribe entirely different conduct: the former dealing with
property taken directly

from a person, the latter dealing with

property not taken from an individual directly.

There would be

no rational legislative purpose behind having a theft statute if

5

Theft may be classified as a second degree felony if the
"actor is armed with a dangerous weapon . . . or . . . property
is stolen from the person of another." See Utah Code Ann. § 766-412(1)(a)(iii), -(iv).
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subsection (1) (a) of the robbery statute could be read to include
non-natural persons.

Accordingly, the trial court committed

reversible error in instructing that Mervyns, a corporation, was
a person under subsection (1)(a).
The trial court's error is highlighted by the fact that the
legislature saw fit to provide an independent provision in the
Utah Code to address the use of force or fear directly against a
person during the commission of a theft within the robbery
statute.

That provision states:

(1) A person commits robbery if: . . . (b) the person
intentionally or knowingly uses force or fear of
immediate force against another in the course of
committing a theft. (2) An act shall be considered "in
the course of committing a theft" if it occurs in an
attempt to commit theft, commission of the theft, or in
the immediate flight after the attempt or commission.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301(1)(b) & -(2). As noted above, the
court and the State expressly declined to pursue this theory of
the case, even after Anderson brought subsection (1)(b) to the
court's attention and warned that there were extant sufficiency
issues going to the "immediate presence" element of subsection
(1)(a).

R.337-38; see infra Point III (discussing insufficiency

of evidence).

The court went further to assert that the State

was bound to proceed under this theory of the case.6

R.33 7.

The trial court correctly noted that the State was bound
to proceed under the theory of robbery presented in the amended
information. To proceed otherwise would violate Anderson's right
under the State and Federal constitutions to be apprised of the
charges against him. See Utah Const. Article I, § 12 ("accused
shall have the right . . . to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, [and] to have a copy thereof"); Article
I, § 13 ("[o]ffenses . . . shall be prosecuted by information");
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Moreover, neither the State nor the trial court amended the
information against Anderson to reflect this particular theory of
robbery.

In fact, the amended information submitted by the State

in this case reiterated that it sought to proceed against
Anderson under the "immediate presence" theory of robbery, and
not under subsection (1)(b).

R.75 (Text of Amended Information -

Included in Footnote 4 ) .
Since the court's instruction does not accurately or fairly
represent the elements of robbery under subsection (1)(a), "it is
impossible . . .

to determine or presume that the jury properly

performed its weighing function."
896 (Utah 1989) .

State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886,

If anything, the instruction only served to

"confuse rather than enlighten the jury, since it concerns terms"
that are not part of § 76-6-301 (1) (a) . Accordingly, Anderson's
case should be reversed and remanded for a new trial.

See Jones,

823 P.2d at 1061.7
U.S. Const, amend. VI ("accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation"); see also
Utah R. Crim. P. 4(a) ("all offenses shall be prosecuted by . . .
information").
In State v. Fulton, 742 P.2d 1208 (Utah 1987), the Utah
Supreme Court interpreted Article I, Section 12 to mean "that the
accused [must] be given sufficient information 'so that he can
know the particulars of the alleged wrongful conduct and can
adequately prepare his defense.1" Id. at 1214 (citation omitted).
If the State was not bound by the charge as stated in the
information, and appellate review was not conducted within those
parameters as well, then Anderson would be denied his right to
present an adequate defense.

The United States Supreme Court recently held that a new
trial is not required in cases where the trial judge failed to
instruct on an element of the crime because the error was

33

III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING ANDERSON'S
MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT WHERE THE STATE DID NOT
PRESENT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF AGGRAVATED ROBBERY.
The trial court erred in denying Anderson's motion for a
directed verdict where the State failed to present sufficient
evidence of aggravated robbery.

R.147-48; see State v. Leleae,

1999 UT App 368 1f 17; 993 P.2d 232 (citations omitted); see also
U.S. Const, amends. V & XIV (due process); Utah Const. Art. I, §
7 (same).

As noted supra Point II, the case was charged under

subsection (1)(a) of the robbery statute, which provides:
(1) A person commits robbery if: (a) the person
unlawfully and intentionally takes or attempts to take
personal property in the possession of another from his
person, or immediate presence, against his will, by
means of force or fear.
See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301(1) (a) (Robbery); Utah Code Ann. §

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Neder v. United States,
119 S.Ct. 1827, 1830, 527 U.S. 1, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999).
Neder does not affect the long-standing rule in Utah that
failure to accurately instruct on all of the elements in a
criminal case can never be harmless. See Jones, 823 P.2d at
1061. First, Utah appellate courts are not required to apply
federal standards of review when presented with challenges to
trial court determinations made under federal law. See State v.
Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1265 (Utah 1993). Rather, this Court is
required to follow the mandate of the Utah Supreme Court
authority and conclude that harmless error review is
inappropriate since failure to accurately instruct a jury
requires reversal as a matter of law. See State v. Laine, 618
P.2d 33, 35 (Utah 1980); State v., Harmon, 712 P.2d 291, 292 (Utah
1986) (Utah Supreme Court refuses State's request to conduct
harmless error review where trial court failed to instruct on
elements of crime).
Additionally, the error in this case involves a violation of
not only federal due process, but also of state due process. See
U.S. Const, amends. V & XIV; Utah Const. Art. I, § 7. Utah is
free to apply an independent standard under the Utah Constitution
and continue finding that such violations require reversal as a
matter of law.
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76-6-302 (1999) (Aggravated Robbery); R.75 (Amended Information Included in Footnote 4 ) .
The evidence, fully marshalled in a light most favorable to
the jury's verdict, does not establish that Anderson took
"personal property" from the "immediate presence" of another and,
hence, fails to establish the elements of aggravated robbery as
set forth in § 76-6-301(1)(a) and § 76-6-302(1)(a).

See State v.

Vessey. 967 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah App. 1998) (citations omitted)
(party challenging sufficiency of evidence on appeal bears burden
of marshaling evidence in favor of verdict and then showing that
it is not sufficient).
The evidence presented at trial going to the "immediate
presence" element as set forth in § 76-6-301(1)(a) is as follows:
- On November 13, 1998, a pair of Nike tennis shoes was
taken from a Mervyns department store.

R.428.

- No Mervyns employee was aware of the theft of the shoes at
the time it occurred.

R.367,397,472.

Rather, Majdi, Ashdown and

Billings confronted a man after because he set off a store alarm
when he passed through the doorway
lot.

from the store to the parking

R.360,362,397,445.
- The theft of shoes was later discovered when an old pair

of Nike shoes were located in a new shoebox and stashed on an
upper shelf in the shoe department.

R.428.

- Majdi testified that she was leaving work for the day.
She was exiting through the door at the same time a man and woman
were leaving.

R.3 61.

The security alarm sounded as they passed
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through the doorway.

R.360.

Majdi asked the man and woman if a

merchandise tag had been left on their purchase which might have
set off the alarm.
quickly.

Id.

R.362.

The man and woman walked away

The woman never answered, but the man turned and

said repeatedly,

M

go ask her.

Maybe this."

R.362-63.

The man

seemed nervous and held a knife in the palm of his hand.

R.376.

He motioned in the direction of the woman he walked out with as
he spoke.
knife.

Majdi stepped back into the store, fearful of the

R.364, 370.

The man ran away.

R.366.

Majdi did not

learn until the next day that a pair of shoes had been taken.
R.367.
- Prior to the confrontation in the foyer, Ashdown, a
Mervyns security officer, saw a man on a surveillance camera from
the camera room.
Id.

R.397.

The man was accompanied by a woman.

Ashdown watched as the man tried on a shoe and walked around

to check its fit.

R.3 98-99.

His behavior made Ashdown

suspicious because he was looking up at the camera and exhibited
other typical "shoplift behavior."
observe an actual shoplift.

R.3 97.

R.3 97-98.

She did not

She was prompted to go to

him only when she saw a light viz a vis the surveillance camera
indicating that he set the alarm off as he walked out of the
store.

Id.

She left the security office at that point to find

out what was going on even though she was not yet aware that the
man took the shoes.

Id.

- Ashdown approached the man in the foyer where Majdi was
also standing.

R.400.

The man walked toward Ashdown with the
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knife, gripped in his fist and pointed at her, stating
repeatedly, "I swear.

Go ask her."

Id.

The man went back and

forth between Ashdown and Majdi with the knife and then ran off.
R.401.

Ashdown did not see the woman earlier seen on the

surveillance video and who the man referred to when he spoke.
Ashdown noticed just before the altercation ended that a
merchandise tag was on one of his shoes and concluded that the
shoes set off the alarm.

R.402.

She realized that a pair of

shoes was actually missing when she reviewed the surveillance
tape after the incident occurred.

R.404-05.

A new shoebox with

an old pair of shoes (size 10 M) in it was also later found.
R.428.

The new shoes (size 10 M) were missing.

Id.

- Billings was walking with Majdi as Majdi was preparing to
leave work for the day.

R.444.

Billings turned to go back into

the store when she heard the alarm sound at the same time that
Majdi walked out the door.
was going on.

Id.

man in the foyer.

R.445.

Billings turned to see what

She pushed the door open and saw Majdi with a
Id.

The man had a knife in his hand.

Id.

Billings watched as Ashdown ran out to assist Majdi.

Id.

Billings saw the man jump between Majdi and Ashdown.

R.446.

held a knife in a threatening manner toward Majdi.

He

R.446-47.

Majdi and Ashdown came back in and seemed nervous and afraid.
R.449.
- Billings at no point saw the man take a pair of shoes.
R.472.

She had not seen the man in the store prior to the

altercation in the foyer.

R.470.
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She was informed that a pair

of shoes was missing later that evening.

R.465.

This evidence, even when viewed in a light most favorable to
the jury's verdict, does not sufficiently establish the
"immediate presence" element of aggravated robbery.

See Utah

Code Ann. §§ 76-6-301 (1) (a) & 76-6-302 (1) (a) . As the facts amply
establish, neither Majdi, Ashdown or Billings was aware that any
item had been taken from Mervyns when they initially confronted
the man in the foyer to the store.

R.367,397,472.

Moreover,

except for Ashdown, none of them were aware of the man's presence
in the store until he sounded the alarm as he departed.
R.361,470.
For example, Majdi testified that she did not learn until
the next day that a pair of shoes was gone.

R.3 67.

She was not

even aware of the man's presence in the store until they both
walked out the door together and when he sounded the alarm.
R.360-61.

Yet, even the alarm sounding did not alert Majdi that

the man had necessarily stolen merchandise.

As Majdi testified,

the alarm can be tripped when a Mervyns cashier inadvertently
leaves a merchandise tag on a legitimately purchased item.
R.362.

Accordingly, as a matter of policy, Majdi asked the man

if he had a purchase, not if he stole an item.

Id.

Billings likewise never saw the man take a pair of shoes and
remained unaware of the theft until after the altercation.
R.472.

She was not even aware of the man's presence in the store

until the confrontation was occurring.
of the stolen shoes later that evening.
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R.470.
R.465.

She became aware

Ashdown was aware of the man's presence via a surveillance
camera.

R.397.

However, she never saw an actual shoplift on the

surveillance video.

Id.

She did not personally confront the man

until she saw that he tripped the alarm as he exited the store.
Id.

Even during the confrontation, Ashdown was not certain that

a theft occurred; she only speculated that a pair of shoes was
gone when she noticed a merchandise tag on the shoe of the man in
the foyer just before he left.

R.402.

She learned that a theft

actually occurred after she reviewed the surveillance video and
noticed that the man wore a different pair of shoes as he exited
the store than when he initially appeared on the camera.
05.

R.404-

She also later discovered a new shoe box containing an old

pair of shoes stashed on the shelf in the shoe department.
R.428.
Given that no-one was aware of the man's presence in Mervyns
until the confrontation in the foyer, let alone of the theft of
the shoes, there was no "tak[ing] of personal property in the
possession of another from his person, or immediate presence."
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301(1) (a).

At most, the evidence

establishes a theft, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1999), and an
aggravated assault.

Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-5-102(1)(c) & 76-5-

103 (1) (b) (1999) . Accordingly, the State failed to present
sufficient evidence of the aggravated robbery charge.
Code Ann. §§ 76-6-301 (1) (a) & 76-6-302(1) (a) .

See Utah

The trial court,

therefore, erred in denying Anderson's motion for a directed
verdict based on insufficient evidence.
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See Leleae, 1999 UT App

368 H 17.
CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, Anderson respectfully requests
this Court to reverse his conviction and remand for a new trial
on the basis that the trial court erred in denying his motion for
a new trial or on the basis that it misinstructed the jury.
Alternatively, this court should reverse his conviction for
insufficient evidence.
SUBMITTED this / 0 ^ day of August, 2000.

CATHERINE E. LILLY
/
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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